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1. Introduction 
Problem Formulation 
In November 2013, Viktor Yanukovych, now the former president of Ukraine and his 
government announced that they were not signing an agreement that would strengthen 
Ukraine’s ties with the EU. Instead Ukraine was to have a closer cooperation with 
Moscow. This led to intense protesting in the capital of Kiev fighting the endemic 
corruption that Yanukovych’s government symbolized. In February 2014 the pro-
Moscow Yanukovych was driven out of office by violent protests. A new government 
was formed but pro-Russians did not approve of it.  Following the riots, the eastern 
Ukrainian people also called pro-Russians, took acting in Simferopol, the capital of 
Crimea and occupied key buildings. The United Nations General Assembly confirmed 
on 27 March, the annexation of Crimea as a fundamental breach of international law, 
without the shades of uncertainty that other cases have had (Balfour, 2014, p.1). In 
April 2014, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily 
occupied by Russia. In response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate 
destabilization of a neighboring sovereign country, the EU imposed restrictive 
measures against the Russian Federation. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014 the EU have focused on de-escalating the crisis in Ukraine and made 
sanctions several times, tightening restrictions on major Russian state banks and 
companies. They have also blacklisted Russian firms that have been accused of 
undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. The discussion of what sanctions the EU should 
use against Russia is causing a major internal debate between member states who 
have different interests depending on their extent of dependence on Russia.  The 
sanctions that have been and might be made on Russia, will hardly affect some 
European countries, while others have a close relationship to Russia will be hit harder. 
 
‘Given that EU-Russia relations have always developed through the prism of national 
European capitals, one needs to trace the shifts within the EU countries. Here it really 
depends on which country you look at, as perceptions of Russia and expectations 
from the EU as a global actor color the interpretation of the degree of change’ 
(Balfour, 2014, p.1). Germany faces as a difficult energy debate with the ongoing 
Ukraine crisis. Germany imports about 38% of their natural gas supplies from Russia 
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and only supplies 15 % of its gas using its own resources (Deuse, 2014). So if 
sanctions were made on Russian gas, Germany would face a big dilemma, what 
alternatives are there and what effect will it have on the economy? This puts Germany 
in a difficult situation within the EU, because some countries are not dependent on 
Russia at all so the sanctions might not affect their economy or energy supplies. 
Angela Merkel stated that Germany would now reconsider all of their energy policies 
after the Crimean annexation and Russia’s behavior (Deuse, 2014).   
From this acknowledgement we find it interesting to look at Germany and focus on 
the gas dilemma as the prime example of German dependency on Russia. 
This led us to our research question; 
 
How has the dependence on Russian Gas affected Germany’s policies on EU 
sanctions towards Russia? 
 
To answer our research question we have made the following working questions; 
 
1. How has the relationship between Germany and Russia since 1998, affected 
their relationship today? 
2.  How are the current EU sanctions towards Russia affecting Germany? 
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2. Methods of the project 
Literature review 
When we searched for literature to answer the research question, we quickly 
acknowledged that finding academic journals and books about the current situation 
was difficult. Since the conflict began there has been a very rapid change and this has 
happened within a year, the fact that the problem is so current and constantly 
developing makes it difficult to find academic books about the topic, as the conflict 
still is very new. This chapter will assess different criteria for the most used and 
essential materials used to answer our research question. At first, we will examine the 
authors or publishers background, how they argue and if they have the necessary 
sources to support their argument. Next on, the objectivity of the author/publisher and 
if its impartial and prejudicial is analyzed. Lastly the value of the author’s writings is 
analyzed by seeing if there have been used contradicting evidence and other journals 
to discuss their findings and arguments. The relationship between Germany and 
Russia has been well written about up until before the current diplomatic crisis, but 
there have also been conducted perspectives until 2025.  
The section about History and Gerhard Schröder in chapter 3 is mostly based on a 
journal article written by Alexander Rahr. Alexander Rahr is the research director at 
Russian-German forum, former Program Director, German Council on Foreign 
Relations in Berlin and an honorary professor from Moscow State University of 
International Relations. The article was published in the Washington quarterly, which 
is a journal of international affairs, analyzing global strategic changes and their public 
policy implications, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and Taylor & Francis. Furthermore 3 articles were used published by The Wall Street 
Journal, The Washington Post and Bloomberg. Reviewing Angela Merkel, her 
chancellorship and relationship with Russia during her chancellorship, two articles 
were mainly used. First an article from 2007 written by the foreign policy export 
Angel Stent was used. Stent specializes on U.S and European relations with Russia 
and in the article Berlin’s Russia challenge, Russia’s energy exports are discussed and 
Germany and Europe’s dilemma. The article was published in The National Interest, a 
magazine the focuses on American interests based on foreign affairs.  
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The section about values vs. interests is based on a journal from IFRI (Institute 
Francais des Relations Internationales), Comité d’études des relations franco-
allemandes, written by Hannes Adomeit in October 2012. The journal is about the 
relationship between Germany and Russia from 2000 until publishing and a 
perspective of their relationship until 2025. The chapter about values versus interests 
is the one used mostly. IFRI is ranked as the 25nd most influential think tank in the 
world, is based on independent research and targeted towards the use for policy-
makers and other prominent persons in society. It has no affiliation with any political 
party and is independent from all administrative and financial authorities (IFRI 
webpage). Hannes Adomeit is a professor and has worked with EU’s Conflict 
Prevention Network on EU-Russian relations. His writings are based primarily on 
impartial journals from IFRI, his earlier work and different articles. Adomeit use 
these journals in to strengthen his argumentation.  
Information about the EU sanctions was all extracted from official press releases by 
the European council, through the EU’s homepage. Furthermore articles from BBC, 
and RT.com were used to explain, Russia’s response to these sanctions. 
The four-step process is withdrawn from the EPC journal The effectiveness of EU 
sanctions An analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma) written by 
Francesco Giumelli and Paul Ivan. The journal analyzes the effect of EU sanctions on 
four different cases, but it is only the third chapter about four-step process that is 
used. Giumelli is Assistant Professor and has earlier written several policy reports on 
the topic of EU sanctions for different institutes. Ivan is junior policy analyst at EPC 
and has earlier worked as a diplomat and researcher in institutions working with EU 
policies. The four-step chapter is a further elaboration of one of Giumelli former 
journals, but also include several other journals working with the theory of sanctions. 
These different journals are included to support the method and not discuss its 
relevance. Therefore the authors are reticent and say it is not general methodological 
approach yet, but the development is ongoing. The analysis of the sanctions is based 
on the official EU statements and information from their official webpage of EEAS2, 
as well as an article from Time. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  European	  External	  Action	  Service	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A short but efficient article written by Rosa Balfour and was published by the EPC 
(European Policy Center) just after the crisis started in 2014 was used to get a view of 
how Merkel and Germany reacted at first and could then be compared to how things 
have developed. Balfour is Director of the Europe in the World Programme, she has 
researched and published widely on issues relating to European foreign policy. The 
EPC is an independent think tank that focuses on European integration and EU affairs 
using evidence and analysis. Its number one value is independence and transparency 
(EPC webpage). Since there were constantly new articles and news of the crises we 
kept updated with acknowledged newspapers such as The Guardian, The Times, The 
Economist and also kept up with news on CNN, both articles and videos. 
When looking in to statistics and facts about the NEGP, Gazprom’s official website 
and database was used to get empirical material and data. Gazprom has an annual 
report for each country and year and how much the company has exported of gas, oil 
and fuel. Gazprom has also made forecasts for the next years where they estimate how 
much will be needed for the next years. We believed it was best to use the official 
documents. There the story of the NGP is also traced, from when the contract was 
first signed to build the pipeline until today. 
Theory and method 
In this project we use the four-step process method to analyze the effectiveness of the 
sanctions. This method is not a general methodological approach yet, but it can still 
help the author to structure the sanctions imposed by EU on Russia and thus help to 
clarify the differences between the sanctions. The method is created by Francesco 
Giumelli and further elaborated on with Paul Ivan.  
Liberalism and Constructivism are two different theoretical approaches in 
International Relations (IR). IR is the study of different events, phenomena and 
analysis of policies in world politics through the use of different theories and concepts 
(Beavis, 2014). This project applies the theories to explain the actors in the German 
EU policy-making as well as their perception of Russia. 	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3. How has the relationship between Germany and Russia 
since 1998, affected their relationship today? 
History 
Since 1991 and after the cold war the relationship between Germany and Russia has 
been close due to the economic factors, but there has been tension. In order to 
understand why Germany has become so dependent on Russian gas, it is important 
look at how earlier actions may have led to this. 
For many years there has been a good relationship between the two countries, and 
Russia have seen Germany both as a friend and ally (Rahr, 2007, p. 137). This has 
mainly happened because of the importance of trading affairs between the two 
countries, some also argue that Russia does not consider Germany a rival in 
geopolitics as they do concerning the United States for instance. German businesses 
applauded this “friendship” and the opportunities in the Russian market, when it first 
started to bloom (Rahr, 2007, p. 137). Moreover, the German government and 
business have often enjoyed the role as mediator between for example Russia and the 
United States. However, skeptical views of Russia started to increase as a powerful 
second school of thought in German intellectual circles started to appear (Rahr, 2007, 
p. 137). After this the German media followed and Russia’s image took a toll in the 
country, even today the media shows its hostility towards Russia. However 
relationship concerning both politics and economics were succeeding (Rahr, 2007, p. 
138). 
The countries around the Black Sea, Caspian Regions and other regions of the former 
Soviet Union, were undergoing a complicated political and economic transformation. 
Therefore these countries became a part of EU’s new sphere of interest around that 
time period. The EU needed both the democratic and liberal economic reform process 
to succeed in fear of these countries instabilities could affect the EU itself if they 
failed instead (Rahr, 2007, p. 138). This made the task of policy-makers in Germany 
to form policies a struggle. The goal was to introduce a successful well-balanced 
policy that could promote business ties, and engage Russia on liberal reform, and to 
help the growth of the post Soviet states (Rahr, 2007). Germany was dissatisfied with 
the EU not including Russia and former Soviet republics into a broader European 
perspective (Rahr, 2007, p. 138). 
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Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl took the lead in the 1990’s on the issue of 
tackling the role of Russia in the future Europe. Kohl was aware of not provoking 
negative reactions from Russia and therefore he tried to include Russia in several 
negotiations, for example the World Trade Organization (Rahr, 2007). When post-
Soviet Russia suffered from severe economic problems in the 1990’s, Germany was 
one of the countries that helped as a creditor. The French-German-Russian summits 
since 1997 was made for avoiding a Russian feel of exclusion in the decisions made 
in Europe, even though it was not a member of EU or NATO (Rahr, 2007, p. 139). 
Kohl had said in this period regarding their situation “Russia is Germany's most 
important neighbor in the East, and it will remain so” (Kohl, 2014).   
Russia had made several efforts to reintegrate itself into the new European order. 
Together with the former German chancellor Gerhard Shröder, Vladimir Putin 
proposed a broad energy dialogue. In September 2001, Putin suggested in his speech 
the Reichstag to combine the vast Siberian energy sources, with the more 
technologically developed space (The Guardian, 2001). 
However, the EU took a cautious approach towards Putin’s offers. The EU wanted it 
to be a process where they took one step at a time concerning foreign affairs, 
economic cooperation, interior security aspects, and cultural issues. Both sides made 
an effort to find common strategic interests, but Russia did not meet EU’s liberal 
values. This resulted in an increasingly frustration in Russia’s people (Rahr, 2007, p. 
139). Although, the economic dimension of their relationship prospered. In Schröder's 
reign, an agreement of constructing one of the biggest pipelines in the world was 
signed and the relationship between the two countries became closer. Around 2006 
Russia started to use their gas exports as a political tool, raising gas prices and cutting 
off supplies to its neighbors. Russia refused that their pipeline system would undergo 
any form of international control, therefore a fear of becoming a subject to 
geopolitical blackmail arouse in the EU (Rahr, 2007). 
Gerhard Schröder 
Gerhard Schröder served as chancellor in Germany from 1998 to 2005. From the 
beginning of his chancellorship he had a very positive view towards Russia and 
placed the relationship at a high value. As Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder was a strong 
advocate of the Nord Stream pipeline project. The purpose of this project was to 
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supply Russian gas directly to Germany, thereby bypassing transit countries. Just 
before Gerhard Schröder lost his chancellorship to Angela Merkel in 2005, he 
successfully pushed through the Baltic Sea pipeline construction project. After the 
election and some weeks before Gerhard Schröder stepped down as chancellor of 
Germany, the German government guaranteed to cover 1 billion euros of the Nord 
Stream project cost (Rahr, 2007).  Soon after stepping down as chancellor, Schröder 
accepted Gazprom's nomination for the post of the head of the shareholders' 
committee of Nord Stream AG, raising questions about a potential conflict of interest. 
The opposition in Germany together with governments of countries who were to be 
affected by the build of this pipeline looked at it with concern. The American 
newspaper The Washington Post published an article called “Gerhard Schröder’s 
Sellout”, where Gerhard Schröder received criticism, on international ramifications of 
his new post. Democrat Tom Lantos, chairman of the United States House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, called Schröder “a political prostitute” for his behavior 
(Washington Post, 2005). Other publications followed, as the Wall Street Journal 
reported that Schröder would join the board of the oil company “TNK-BP”, a joint 
venture between oil major BP and Russian partners (Herron, 2009). The friendship 
between Putin and Schröder has always been a factor in Schröder’s politics, and is a 
relationship that goes on to this day. Schröder celebrated his 70th birthday with Putin 
this year in St. Petersburg, and even though Schröder is retired from politics today, he 
still makes an effort to help his friend in German-Russia affairs (Delfs, 2014). 
Angela Merkel 
Angela Merkel took over as the chancellor of Germany in 2005, the first women ever 
to hold this position. Merkel grew up in east Germany, speaks fluent Russian, she 
experienced Soviet Communism at close hand and thus had a more skeptical view of 
Russia than her predecessor did. It was expected that she would be stricter on her 
Russia policy than Schröder was (Stent, 2007, p.4). For more than 10 years now she 
and Putin have worked together, they seem to have shared an understanding and 
respect for each other. They are fluent in each other languages and since Germany and 
Russia have strong energy- and economic ties they have worked closely together, but 
not always without conflicts. Merkel has earned the respect of Kremlin for her years 
in duty and that puts her in a potentially risky role as a chief mediator on the Crimean 
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crises. Since the crisis started they have been in touch through the phone at least one 
time a week and arguments have been raised. Merkel has become tougher on Putin 
and the crises have made her a lot more skeptical towards Russia. Even if Merkel was 
never a ‘friend’ of Putin like Schröder was she had focused on keeping the 
relationship good and stable in order to keep the overall relationships in central and 
east Europe peaceful. Questions were raised why Merkel was more cautious when it 
came to sanctioning Russia than other world leaders, her reason for holding back at 
first were purely in economic favors but she made clear from the start that if things 
would not get better Germany would support the 3. round sanctions, which they did. 
(Ukraine crisis, 2014) Merkel was also under the spotlight during the crisis between 
Russia and Georgia in 2008 but in the 2009 elections, Germany still remained focused 
on a strong energy partnership with Russia, which undeniably shows that she did trust 
Putin before (Russia strengthens ties with Germany, 2009) 
Merkel has throughout her chancellorship been exceptionally popular among the 
public and still is after so many years in office. Since the Crimean Crisis started 
Merkel has observed Putin’s behavior and at the EU summit the 20th of March 2014 
she told European leaders that Putin could no longer be trusted (Balfour, 2014, p.2). 
Being chancellor of Germany at times like these definitely makes Merkel face 
contradictory pressures on her Russia policy from the economy perspective vs. the 
media and many advocacy groups (Stent, 2007, p.4-5). But as the crisis has developed 
and Russia’s policy seems to stay the same, all perspectives seem to be coming to the 
same conclusion, the politics, economy and the public (Shuster, 2014). 
(Northern European Gas Pipeline) Gas - Russia and Germany  
As earlier mentioned Schröder made an agreement with Russia to build a new 
pipeline to transfer gas between the two countries just before he left the 
chancellorship. It was then in Merkel’s hands to supervise the board to construct the 
building of the Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP). Germany and other EU 
countries had focused on decreasing their overall dependency on Russia for the last 
decade. At the same time the massive NEGP was in construction that would 
obviously make them more dependent on Russia than before. The construction of the 
pipeline arose many debates in the EU, both for the reason that it would make EU 
countries more dependent on Russia and because it would threaten energy security.  
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The NEGP is one of the largest subsea gas pipelines in the world. Construction started 
in 2005 and the pipeline was finished in 2012. The subsea pipeline goes from Vyborg 
in the Russian Federation to Greifswald in Germany. It is owned by the Nord Stream 
AG but the biggest shareholder is the Russian energy giant, Gazprom that owns 51% 
share in the pipeline (Friedrich and Neumüller, 2007, p.12). 
Germany is Gazprom’s largest market in the EU, it was first supplied gas from Russia 
under a long-term contract in 1973. Germany was supplied with 33.16 billion cubic 
meters of gas from Gazprom in 2012 and in 2013 it was up to 41 billion cubic meters 
(Gazprom background, 2013/ 2014). For the last years export of gas from Russia has 
increased and in the next years Gazprom estimates that it will only get more. 
According to forecasts, by 2025 the gap between domestic production and 
consumption in Europe will amount to 168 billion cubic meters, and by 2035 to 225 
billion cubic meters. This creates bigger opportunities for Gazprom to strengthen their 
position in the European market (Gazprom media, 2013). The NEGP is the essential 
in the discussion between Germany and Russia, because it undeniably made the 
countries more dependent on each other and therefore makes it difficult to see change 
in their relationship and an alternative option for Germany’s gas supplies in the next 
years (Solum W, 2008, p.13). 
Values versus interests  
The relationship between Germany and Russia will be studied through two theoretical 
approaches in this project, liberalism and Constructivism in International Relations. 
The liberal understanding is applied here because according to their theory the 
explanation of the actors in foreign policy is not only states and their power to 
influence the international system, but also includes interests of individual 
preferences, domestic actors and their possibility to serve interests of the dominant 
groups in politics, the society and the bureaucracy. To fully understand this 
relationship it is also relevant to use the constructivist school thoughts about values, 
ideas and norms as factor in shaping behavior, not only interests. The focus is on how 
Germany’s values and interests have affected their relationship with Russia (Adomeit, 
2012 p. 15-16). 
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When talking about values versus interests in German politics and business towards 
Russia some argue that values are important. The importance lies in the fact that 
Russian officials says that they follow European values as rule of law and democracy. 
Because they are a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE3, in contrast to for 
example China, it is fair to hold Russia obliged to its commitments and obligations. 
This argument is used by most of Russia specialists, correspondents and media in 
Germany. Some German specialists on Russia also argue that doing ‘business as 
usual’ in Russia when gross violations human and civil rights are happening it might 
serve to ‘import’ corruption into German enterprises. To eliminate rampant 
corruption, the rule of law, independence of judiciary, investigative journalism and a 
vibrant civil society is needed for practical reasons, but this will at the same time 
clash with the “Putin system” (Adomeit, 2012, p. 15-21). The system can shortly be 
described as following: politically consisting of a centralized small group of leaders 
who uses their governmental powers to their own benefit and reelection; state control 
of essential resources in the economy and its use for personal interests; absence of 
rule of law and the governments control over the judiciary and at last political 
restrictions on social movements, NGOs and shortage of freedom of speech. It is 
difficult to imagine that Putin will approve major changes in the system while he is in 
power (Adomeit, 2012, p. 17, 20). 
The opposition to this view believes Germany should not mix values and interests 
together and ought to stop hitting Russia with a cudgel of morality. It consists of 
government officials, influential political party members from primarily SPD, 
business and banking leaders and research institutes with pro-Russian connections. 
Franz Walter Steinmeier, currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a leading 
member of SPD and the German government, is one of several politicians who share 
and advocates this view towards Russia and use the same expertise as Gerhard 
Schröder, his former chief. This expertise is provided by the analyses from the 
Eastern Committee and the Berthold Beitz Centre of Excellence for Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Central Asia, which sponsors and partners is the Ostausschuss der 
deutschen Wirtschaft4, Deutsche Bank, Gazprom and the Russian Embassy in Berlin. 
The centers analyses are conducted to be in line with the viewpoints of their sponsors 
and partners and can be described as propaganda, with the purpose of showing Russia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Europe	  4	  The	  Committee	  on	  Eastern	  European	  Economic	  Relations	  
Roskilde University  Group: 17 
The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science Benjamin, Pablo & Urdur. 
	   14	  
in a positive light and meet the Russian critic. They also aim to portray the value-
based Russian criticism as counterproductive and as equivalent to isolating Russia. 
Instead, a more pragmatic approach should be followed (Adomeit, 2012, p. 15-23). 
 
Most think the political relationship between Germany and Russia has worsened 
steadily for many years, but it is the opposite with the economy. Germany was 
Russia’s single most important partner in economic affairs and Russia is the most 
important energy supplier for Germany. In 2011, 8.7 % of Russia’s foreign trade was 
with Germany, which makes Germany the second most important trade partner after 
China. Compared to 2000 the German-Russian trade was an amounted to EUR 13 
billion and in 2011 it had increased to a record of EUR 75 billion. In 2011, the 
German export to Russia increased with 31 % and Germany imported 27 % more 
from Russia, with a total growth of 29 % compared to 2010. The trade also increased 
with 15.9 % in the first quarter of 2012 and thus continued its progress. The basis of 
the German-Russian trade is and has been since the Soviet era based on export of 
primarily natural gas, oil, metal goods and petrochemical products to Germany and 
import of industrialized products as mechanical engineering goods, chemical and 
electronic products, vehicles and parts related to vehicles. 
The need to modernize Russia and its industry has been an important export-market 
for Germany, but also a marked where vast investments have been made. More than 
6300 German companies are present in Russia and in the first two quarters of 2011, 
EUR 4.2 billion was invested in Russia, around the same as in 2010 for the same 
period (Adomeit, 2012, p. 23-24). The trade relations have also been clear at the 
intuitional level between the two countries. Since 2000, annual meetings between the 
two governments with economic affairs as the primary topic have been held. These 
meetings were held with discretion and have had the purpose of linking business and 
politics together an example is the Nord Stream project. In Germany the previously 
mentioned lobbyist group Committee on Eastern Economic Relations and in Russia, 
the Delegation of German Business and the German Business Association, is the 
advocate for increased business between the two countries. Even though German 
business has invested large amounts of money in Russia, the investment climate still 
has several obstacles to become more attractive, such as massive corruption and the 
widespread belief that law is not beneficial for society, called ‘legal nihilism’. The 
German lobby group Ostausschuss have advocated for more transparency, a change 
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away from ‘legal nihilism’ and focus more on fighting corruption, this be despite the 
lobby groups view of values as ‘counterproductive’ when regarding business 
(Adomeit, 2012, p. 23-26).  
Resource alternatives  
Some countries in the EU that are more dependent on Russian gas than Germany, but 
Germany still imports the most gas and is Russia’s most important importer. The 
issue is that Germany does not have many options if they were to sanction the gas 
from Russia or if Russia would turn off the tap and sanction them. There are in fact 
only three options available and none of them is especially attractive. The alternatives 
are possible to execute but will inevitably cost more. 
First option would be to import more from other countries like the Netherlands and 
Norway, which are in forehand Germany’s main gas suppliers along with Russia. This 
is the best short time option because the gas flows through low risk pipelines. The 
problem is that this might not work in the long run since gas production in the North 
Sea is believed to be in decline. 
Second option would be to start to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from major 
gas-producing countries like Qatar and the US. This option has been on the tables for 
some time but there are problems, first of all exports from US LNG will not start until 
a few years from now and even if Germany would want to start importing gas from 
them, there are other countries that have secured this gas supplies through long term 
binding contracts, so Germany would not be in the prior line to get gas from them. It 
would also be difficult to get a trader from the US that could secure Germany with 
enough gas at short notice.  
The third option is to drill for gas with in Germany using hydraulic cracking. 
According to researches there is in fact 2,3 trillion cubic meters of shale gas in 
Germany, which would be enough to meet their domestic demand and last for up to a 
century. But this options stops at political and environmental rivals since the German 
Environment Minister is seeking to ban most forms of cracking until the year 2021. If 
the ban becomes a reality, Germany will be especially vulnerable to any shortfalls in 
Russian gas supplies. But Angela Merkel has made it clear as said here before that 
Germany is reconsidering all of their energy imports at the moment and they will try 
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their best to find a solution to the problem even though this is an extremely difficult 
issue (Sreekumar, 2014). 
Sub-conclusion 
Looking at how the relationship has changed since 1998, one will quickly see that 
there have been noticeable changes. Schröder and Putin were known to be good 
friends and still are. Schröder based his knowledge on reports from pro-Russian lobby 
groups and openly spoke warmly about Russia. When Schröder lost the 
chancellorship to Merkel, it changed. At first the change was at a personal level, 
Schröder and Putin were friends, but Merkel and Putin were not. This was despite the 
fact that many speak of them having a special relation due to their past. Ever since 
2005, the relationship has got more and more cold and is currently at all-time low 
both personally and officially from the German perspective. This is in spite of that 
Putin recently said Russian-German relations never had been as good as they 
currently are if you look at the last 10-15 years (Kirschbaum, 2014). Regarding the 
clash between values and interests, Schröder thought of Russia as already following 
western values and therefore there were no clash. The behavior at the time was a 
liberal approach towards Russia, since domestic actors such as businesses, but also 
the friendship of the two leaders influenced Germany’s behavior in the relationship. 
When Angela Merkel became Chancellor a more constructivist approach was 
followed, hence the augmented emphasis on values and a more skeptical view on the 
political system. The constructivist approach has become more and more clear, which 
today has ended in Germany sanctioning Russia for its clash with German values. 
Today, the relationship is still affected by the two different approaches towards 
Russia, which is seen in different domestic actors and some politician’s criticism of 
Angela Merkel’s policies towards Russia. 
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4. How are the current EU sanctions towards Russia 
affecting Germany? 
Sanctions 
The European Union has since the problem appeared focused on sanctions, in order to 
de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has reached out to all sides, in order to find 
a lasting solution to protect Ukraine. Moreover, to ensure a stable, prosperous and 
democratic future for all of Ukraine's citizens, the EU has proposed to step-up its 
support on economic and political reforms in Ukraine. 
A meeting was held in The Council of the European Union on the 3rd of March 2014. 
The Council of the European Union is the third of the seven institutions of the 
European Union and it is part of the essentially bicameral EU legislature. It represents 
the executive governments of the EU’s member’s states. On this meeting they 
expressed how the Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity were in clear 
violation by acts of aggression conducted by the Russian army. The council was very 
clear about how they disapproved of this behavior. The authorization to use armed 
forces in the territory of Ukraine, given by the Federation Council of Russia on the 1 
of March 2014, was also something the European council condemned (EU 
Homepage, 2014). A move was made by the EU to reach out to Russia, demand the 
withdrawal of its armed forces in Ukraine (EU homepage, 2014). In a meeting held on 
March 6, the EU made it clear that a solution was of high importance and was to be 
found by getting the Ukraine and Russia to start negotiating (EU Homepage, 2014). 
After realizing that these negotiations were not happening nor about to, the EU agreed 
on the start of sanctions towards the Russian Federation. This was in the hopes of a 
peaceful solution and underlining, that in order to make that a reality Russia has to 
start contributing actively and without ambiguities in finding a solution. 
The sanctions made in this case can be explained through 4 rounds. These rounds give 
us a timeline from when the first sanctions were made in March, to the present were 
the following sanctions are still in effect. 
1. round of sanctions: 
Because of the missing willingness of the Russian Federation to de-escalate the 
situation with Ukraine, on 17 March 2014, the first travel bans and asset freezes were 
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sat in motion, targeting 21 Russian and Ukrainian individuals involved in the Crimean 
breakaway (CCTV, 2014). Three to four days later, 12 more individuals were added 
to list of travel bans and asset freezes. Furthermore the European Council cancelled a 
planned EU-Russia summit (European Council, 2014). 
On 20 and 24 March 2014, three days after the first sanctions were presented by the 
EU and the USA, The Russian Foreign Ministry responded. They presented a list of 
sanctions to the media, targeting individuals from the United States and Canada, 
leaving out the EU (RT, 2014). Although the EU was not targeted, Russia was clear 
about the consequences of the sanctions towards Russia. In a statement published by 
the Foreign Ministry, they mention that Russia repeatedly has stressed that using 
sanctions against Russia will only have a boomerang effect (RT, 2014). 
2. round of sanctions: 
On 28 April 2014, the European Union issued travel bans against a further fifteen 
individuals, as a result to Russia’s absence of any de-escalation in Ukraine. In 
connection with this, the EU issued a paper stating the aims of the sanctions. It states 
that the sanctions are not meant as a punishment, but rather to bring about change of 
policy by the target country, entities or individuals (European Council, 2014). The 
planned G8 summit in Sochi, became a G7 meeting instead and were held in Brussels 
on 4-5 June. EU countries also supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia's 
joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency (EU Homepage, 2014). 
 
3. round of sanctions: 
On 25 July, the EU added even more to its sanctions, and targeted an additional 
fifteen individuals and eighteen entities, followed by an additional eight individuals 
and three entities on 30 July (EU Homepage, 2014). These additions were made 
because of the escalation of violence in Ukraine and the killing of almost 300 
civilians on board of the MH17 flight. After this incident, the EU agreed to strengthen 
its sanctions against Russia, and on 31 July 2014 they introduced sanctions against 
certain sectors of Russia's economy, including the state-owned parts of the financial 
sector (EU Council, 2014).  Furthermore trade restrictions relating to the Russian oil 
and defense industries, additional individuals and entities designated under the EU 
asset freezing provisions were made (EU Council, 2014). 
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As a response to these sanctions, Putin signed a decree On 6 August 2014, on the use 
of specific economic measures. This meant the start of an effective embargo for a 
one-year period on imports of most of the agricultural products that came from 
countries that had adopted or joined the idea of these economic sanctions towards 
Russia (RT, 2014). The next day, a list of countries that the sanctions would target 
was released. The countries were the United States, the EU, Norway, Canada and 
Australia, including a ban on fruit, vegetables, meat, fish, milk and dairy imports. 
Before this sanction of embargo, food exports from the EU to Russia were worth 
around €11.8 billion, or 10% of the total exports (BBC, 2014).  
4. round of sanctions: 
On 12 September a new set of sanctions were published in EU official journal, 
targeting Russia’s state finances, energy and arms sector. This means that Russian 
state banks are excluded from raising long-term loans in the EU. In addition export of 
dual-use equipment for military use in Russia are banned, EU-Russia arms deals are 
banned and the EU will no longer export oil industry technology (BBC, 2014). Three 
major state oil firms were also targeted and further twenty-four individuals were 
added to the list of those subject to the travel ban and assets freeze (EU council). 
Furthermore the EU council reinforced its restrictive measures on 29 November by 
adding thirteen individuals and five entities to this list (EU council). 
 
To summaries the EU actions made towards Russia they have included diplomatic 
measures as seen in the exclusion of Russia in the G7 meeting in Brussels, the EU-
Russia summit that was cancelled and EU member states have decided not to hold 
regular bilateral summits. Also talks with Russia in visa matters and on the New 
Agreement between the EU and Russia are suspended (EU homepage). Furthermore 
restrictive measures is also included in the sanctions like the asset freezes and visa 
bans, that today apply a hundred and thirty-two individuals while twenty-eight entities 
are subject to a freeze of their assets in the EU (EU homepage). Restrictions for 
Crimea and Sevastopol have also been imposed, due to the fact that the EU does not 
recognize the annexation. This implies a prohibition on imports from both Crimea and 
Sevastopol, unless accompanied by a certificate of origin from the Ukrainian 
authorities. Trade and investment restrictions have also been implemented in 
infrastructure projects in transport, telecommunications and energy and exploitation 
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of oil, gas and minerals. Key equipment to these sectors may not be exported (EU 
homepage). At last there are the economic measures, targeting sectorial cooperation 
and exchanges with Russia. EU nationals and companies are prohibiting buying or 
selling bonds, equity or similar financial instruments issued by five major state-owned 
Russian banks, three major Russian energy companies and three major Russian 
defense companies. In addition EU nationals and companies may not provide loans to 
the five state-owned banks. An embargo on the export and import of arms to/from 
Russia are in effect, also covering exports of dual use goods and technology for 
military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users. Also the energy related sectors 
are targeted. Export licenses will be denied if products are destined for deep-water oil 
exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects 
in Russia. Also services in relation to this like drilling, well testing or logging 
services, may not be provided (EU Homepage).  
The four-step process 
The four-step process can be used to measure the effectiveness of sanctions. The first 
step is placing sanctions within the overall EU strategy. When looking at the 
sanctions it is relevant to look at the broader foreign policy, because an understanding 
of what the EU wants to accomplish with their foreign policy and what the strategy is, 
can make it easier to measure the effectiveness. There are many different actions, 
such as diplomatic tools, incentives, sanctions and use of force the EU can use to 
change the policies of other actors. Each of these instruments can have a different 
relative weight. Sanctions can sometimes be the essential instrument, while other 
times it might be of marginal interest. Placing the sanctions in the larger foreign 
strategy will give an idea of the role sanctions play.     
After defining whether the sanctions are central or marginal. The second step is 
defining the logic of the sanctions and if they are coercing, constraining or signaling 
targets. The three ways sanctions are expected to influence their target by trying to 
change the conduct coercing the actor, constraining it through limiting its behavior or 
signal the actor thru a message and underlining a the importance of a norm. 
Implementing the policies desired by coercing the actor is an attempt to persuade 
them, but the behavioral change should be a voluntary act by the target, which means 
that if they comply the sanctions, does not clash with their essential needs. Sometimes 
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the EU asks for major political change, but as long as the actor has a choice, they will 
not follow such obligations. This is where constraining sanctions is supposed to work 
as an action, which makes everything challenging for the target. At last, sanctions can 
also be used as a signal that violating a norm will create reactions. Signaling sanctions 
are also useful as material sanctions might end up hitting unintended targets and even 
the targets whom the EU is to protect, which would undermine the principle of 
sanctions. The three ways of sanctioning can coexist within the same sanctioned 
establishment. Some parts of the sanctions might try to constrain the establishment, 
while other could be coerced, but also the active evolution in the behavior of the 
establishment and changing situation might acquire moving from one kind of 
sanctions to another.   
The third step is about the cost and impact of sanctions. The impact dimension can 
either be direct, indirect and unintended. The direct impact is the anticipated burden 
on the target, while the indirect is the collateral damage and harm, such as higher food 
prices, less consumer options, etc. and the unintended is the consequences the 
imposters has not expected. The cost dimension is deemed by the cost EU member 
states have imposing sanctions and it is argued that if there is no cost, the action is not 
credible5. That means the more EU and the target suffers from the sanctions the better 
they are, but because EU consists of many different member states, the union has to 
be aware of an eventual uneven burden between the member states caused by the 
sanctions. 
The last and fourth step is the comparative utility of sanctions and is to be understood 
as what could have been done instead of sanctions. To do this counterfactual 
comparison is important, because it makes it easier to judge whether the sanctions 
was the best decision accessible for the policy-makers. The sanctions have to be 
measured on their contribution to the overall foreign policy and if other tools could 
have done the same, but at minor cost. Success can be based on the three ways from 
step two. In coercive and constraining sanctions, a cost-benefit calculation made by 
the target should increase the chance that the target changes behavior and pursue the 
desired policies. The favorable outcome of signaling sanctions is the projection of a 
certain image of the EU towards the rest of the world, also as a strengthening of 
desired global norms and a pointer that the crisis has escalated to a higher level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5Lisa	  Martin,	  Coercive	  Cooperation:	  Explaining	  Multilateral	  Economic	  Sanctions,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992	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diplomatic hostility. The last step still has a need for a general methodological 
approach, which development is ongoing. It can still be used as an instrumental 
exercise to analyze sanctions and compare them to other cases, but we will only look 
at the current EU sanctions imposed on Russia (Giumelli, Ivan, p. 9-11). 
 
Analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  sanctions 
Germany as a EU Member States have committed itself to CFSP6, which goals is to 
influence policies violating values as rule of law, democracy, human rights and 
international law. For addressing these violations the EU has designed restrictive 
measures of both diplomatic and economic nature (EEAS, CFSP). EU says the 
sanctions are one of EU’s tools to promote the objectives of CFSP and that they are 
always a part of a comprehensive policy, which also involves political dialogue and 
complementary efforts (EU restrictive measures, 2014). At the beginning, EU used its 
diplomatic tools trying to persuade the Russian leadership to find a peaceful 
resolution through collective and bilateral work. Mixed messages came from the 
Russian leadership, but the demands have in practice been left unheeded. Therefore 
harsher sanctions were made (Statement by EU, 2014). Sanctions are currently the 
EU’s main instrument towards Russia, but the there is a different weight in the 
sanction. 
The first round of sanctions imposed travel bans and asset freezes on many influential 
people. Only targeting individuals of importance to the violations conducted has a 
signaling value. By not starting with broader material sanctions they signal the policy-
makers that their policy and actions are wrong and avoid hitting the unintended 
targets, such as the Russian civilians. Since the crisis escalated and the requirements 
were not met, a second round of sanctions was imposed. These included more 
individuals, but also several banks. It was not until the third round that the sanctions 
became constraining on specific sectors of the Russian economy. By specifically 
constraining Russian state banks and the energy sector, they aimed at bringing heavy 
costs to the Russian economy, thus coercing Russia to change its behavior (EU 
Statement, 2014). 
In the Statement from EU 5 September 2014, they say that the economic sanctions 
have followed several criteria. These criteria was about the effectiveness, cost/benefit, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Common	  Foreign	  Security	  Policy	  for	  the	  European	  Union	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balance across sectors and Member States, international coordination, 
reversibility/scalability, legal defensibility/ease of enforcement. The EU thus says it 
have taken the third step into account when deciding the sanctions (EU Statement, 
2014). In the Statement 29 July 2014 the EU says they both have common interests 
and benefit from cooperation and exchange, but as long Russia’s behavior is 
unchanged a positive agenda wont be pursued (EU Statement, 2014). In a speech in 
November Angela Merkel said that Russia’s old way of thinking would fail and the 
west would win even if the path is hard, long and full of setbacks (Shuster, Time, 
2014). Merkel here implies that Germany is willing to sacrifice a lot to change 
Russia’s behavior. This goes well with the idea that the tougher the sanctions are on 
EU itself, the tougher they will be on Russia.  
 
Since the crisis is ongoing and so recent is difficult to say if the sanctions have been a 
success in the long term, but the Russian government have not changed it behavior so 
far, therefore the sanctions have not been a success in the short term. When the crisis 
started the EU did not have many options of actions. A military involvement was and 
is unwanted (McGeough, SMH, 2014), so the EU could either accept the Russian 
behavior or use restrictive measures to try and change it. The future will show if the 
choices made by EU will succeed, but no matter what the sanctions will have signaled 
Russia and rest of world that certain behavior is not accepted.  
Germany in the EU  
Germany is the most populated country in the EU and holds the biggest economy as 
well. Due to Germany’s economic success and geographic location in Europe they 
hold a great power within the EU as well as they have formed close relationship to 
many countries in central Europe that also makes their economy stronger (Kundnani, 
2013). Germany has therefore been in a leading position and has tried to keep the EU 
sanctions from hurting their economy. Merkel has been very outspoken about tougher 
measures towards Russia and her worries about Putin’s behavior after the Crimean 
crises. At first, despite Merkel’s decision of participating in EU sanctions against 
Russia, the public and the business sector seemed not to be on her side. According to 
opinion polls from the beginning of the crises in 2014 majority of Germans believed 
that Ukraine should belong to Russia sphere of interest and did not see the annexation 
of Crimea as a big deal. ‘Big businesses warned the cost of economic sanctions and 
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the risk that Russian retaliation to economic sanctions would have a disastrous impact 
on the German industry and economy’ (Balfour, 2014, p.2). Putin tried to reach out to 
the German public to keep them on Russia’s side arguing that it was important to 
work things out with them because their economies are so closely connected and that 
sooner or later the sanction would start to affect their economy as well. But the public 
in Germany seems to have changed their mind, and a nationwide survey from August 
2014 showed that 82% Germans did not trust Russia and 70% now called for tougher 
sanctions on the Russian economy (Shuster, 2014).  
However, it is a fact that the economic sanctions on Russia will have a negative effect 
on Germany’s economy. According to numbers from August 2014 German economic 
growth would shrink from 0,8 in the first quarter towards a zero in the second due to 
the economic sanctions that were imposed on Russia that targeted it’s energy, banking 
and defense sectors (Kirschbaum, 2014). These sanctions were believed to be 
necessary in order to make peace in Europe. Germany’s economy minister, Sigmar 
Gabriel said in a meeting in October that further sanctions on Russia would not help 
solving the crises in Ukraine. Gabriel has been on board with Merkel on the sanctions 
so far but now believes taking them to the next level will only make things more 
difficult (Kirschbaum, 2014). 
German Policy-making in EU 
The German Federal Government is a part of EU’s legislative process as member of 
the Council of the European Union as well as all other member states. When the 
Commission has proposal for a new law, the lead ministry who is affected by the law 
has to ensure that the Federal government has agreed on a position on the proposal 
before it is discussed in different EU institutions. The lead ministry also has to inform 
the rest of the ministries affected by the proposal and includes their opinions. The 
final agreement is the basis for the Federal Government’s negotiating position in the 
Council. The lead ministry has the responsibility of coordinating the different national 
bodies in the national opinion process, but also preparing the Federal Governments 
representatives position in the future negotiations located in Brussels. The Federal 
Government aim at resolving all coordination on EU policy at the lowest possible 
level through coordination and conflict resolution. It might take a long time to reach 
an agreed position on EU policies if possible at all, therefore different bodies exists at 
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several levels to expedite the ministries in resolving conflicts of interests between 
them.  
 
In 1963 The State Secretaries Committee for European Affairs was established to 
discuss fundamental European issues. The Committee's function is to find an agreed 
position if the ministries are unable to agree on major EU policies which concern 
several ministries. Its task is to avoid including the Cabinet in discussions on EU 
issues whenever possible. The Committee is chaired by several prominent ministries, 
such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, The Federal Foreign Office and 
the German Permanent Representative to the EU.  
The European Affairs Directors-General is a group a level below the State Secretaries 
Committee for European Affairs and it is focused on solving as well as target any 
future conflicts on EU matters between ministries. It primary functions is to inform 
and warn the ministries on controversial and/or politically relevant legislation 
submitted by the European Commission, which are up for decision in the near future, 
but also coordinate a joint position on European issues and the further procedure. 
Another body is the EU Coordination Group, which is a part of the European Affairs 
Directors-General. Its function is to analyze the opinion-forming process in different 
EU institutions and Member States, so as to identify potential conflicts and locate the 
Member States positions to ensure Germany’s negotiation position will not be 
outvoted or isolated (Federal Foreign Office, 2014).  
The Germany’s Permanent Representative to the EU can be described as a German 
embassy in the EU. Its task is to keep contact between Berlin and Brussels, but its a 
part of the legislative process through the Committee of Permanent Representatives, 
called COREPER. COREPER is the body, which prepare the work of the Council and 
thus work out the compromises when there is conflict of interest among Member 
States (The Federal Government, 2014). All Germany’s embassies in the other 
Member States is tasked with convincing the public and directly lobby governments 
for Germany’s interests, thereby to strengthen the German Permanent Representatives 
negotiation positions in Brussels. Each embassy has one or several EU Affairs 
Officers whom only work with these tasks (Federal Foreign Office, 2014). 
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Sub-conclusion 
Answering the question how the current EU sanctions towards Russia are affecting 
Germany is difficult since most of the effects are long term. However some effects are 
already visible, for example the embargo sat in place by Russia is going to shrink 
Germany's economic growth. The 1. round of sanctions did not affect Germany at all 
since they only targeted individuals close to Putin. Hence Russia showed no interests 
in opposing the pro-Russian forces in Ukraine in order to de-escalate the crisis, the 
EU imposed a 2. round of sanctions which was an extension on the 1. round. After the 
shooting of the civilian airplane and the death of 300 civilians in July, the EU decided 
to strengthen the sanctions against Russia and that resulted in a 3. round of sanctions. 
These sanctions were targeting Russia’s economy, focusing on state-owned financial 
institutions. This resulted in the one-year period embargo from Russia on imports of 
most of the agricultural products from EU. As a response a 4th round was introduced. 
The EU and German EU bureaucracy knew that there would be consequences from 
the sanctions that would affect Germany and its economy. Angela Merkel was aware 
that this would happen, but she still supported the EU sanctions and even said harsher 
sanctions might be imposed. The current effects have in general been much more 
severe on Russia than on Germany (Gregory, 2014). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Germany’s dependence on Russian Gas is one of many aspects where Germany and 
Russia are intertwined. The focus on gas in this project comes from the fact that 
Germany receives most of its gas from Russia and without it would face a shortage of 
energy for its citizens and industry. This could have massive consequences for the 
German society. It is no secret that Germany is dependent on Russian Gas like many 
other EU countries. The difference looking at Germany is that it is the most populous 
and one of, if not the most influential member state in the EU. Therefore when 
German interests are at stake the German bureaucracy will use it capabilities to avoid 
this. In Shröder’s time as chancellor the German-Russian trade relationship became so 
much closer. The most important and final act was to sign the agreement of NEGP, 
which made it possible to directly import Russian gas and that made them depend on 
Russia more than ever. It is no secret either that Schröder and Putin were good friends 
and are to this day. The friendship between the leaders has had an impact on both the 
dependency between the two countries but also how the public viewed each other. 
Russian and Germans used to generally have a positive view of each other and this 
was evident in the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis. Many Germans did not oppose 
the annexation of Crimea, but after the shoot down of the civilian aircraft by pro-
Russians the Germans view quickly changed. At first most Germans had a pragmatic 
liberal view, but this was changed into a constructivist view where values weighted 
more and more. When Merkel was elected chancellor she began her chancellorship 
with both being pragmatic and focus more on values. For many years Merkel kept this 
position and the German-Russian trade consisting of natural resources from Russia 
and specialized industrial technology from Germany kept growing. But as the years 
passed and the ‘Putin-system’ became more rooted and the differences became 
increasingly evident. Despite the differences in values the trade was still growing. The 
current crisis has forced Germany to look at their alternatives on importing Russian 
gas. None of the three possible alternatives are attractive, which makes Germany look 
at the policy-making of the sanctions. The first two rounds of sanctions imposed by 
EU on Russia only targeted individuals and this did not affect Germany’s economy at 
all. They were also not meant to cause any damage to the economy, but functioned as 
a signal to the policy-makers in Kreml. It was a warning that EU and Germany did not 
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approve of Russia’s actions and that the EU was not afraid to make sanctions if 
necessary. Merkel was neutral in the beginning of the sanction process and did not 
oppose EU position. She did not have any pragmatic reason to oppose the sanctions 
since they did not affect Germany in a negative way, but nor did she oppose the use of 
tougher restrictive measures. Russian lobby groups in Germany as well as some SPD 
politicians though opposed this with the same orientation as Schröder. Differences of 
policy within the Federal Government were now showing. After the MH17 crash the 
EU it was evident that new sanctions were to be made and constraining ones. The 
policy-making process was done behind closed doors, but the German EU 
bureaucracy in all Members States and Brussels were, as they always are, working for 
the interests of Germany. When the 3rd round of sanctions were introduced the gas 
sector was not affected, but instead the oil and financial sector. Its not official if some 
EU countries actually worked towards sanctioning gas, but if they did their attempt 
would have been noticed quickly by the German EU bureaucracy, which would 
actively work against the proposal. The sanction introduced also affected Germany 
because of their widespread trade with Russia, but these sectors are not as crucial for 
German society as the gas. Thus answering how has the dependence on Russian Gas 
affected Germany’s policies on EU sanctions towards Russia is difficult because the 
decision-making process is done behind closed doors. It is tough likely that it has had 
an impact on Germany’s position in which sanctions Russia should face. It is evident 
that the current sanctions affect Germany, even though gas is not a part of it, but 
despite this Germany have weighed its values higher than its interests and says will so 
in the future. 
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